Abstract
Introduction
RFID technology has expanded their applications to many areas: access control, vehicle tracking and pharmaceutics, etc. However, due to widely deploy for the RFID applications, some useful information can be cracked by attackers. A large part of the RFID security research is currently focused on RFID authentication protocols. Thus, to eliminate the security problem and reduce the computation costs, numerous RFID authentication schemes using grouping proofs and ECC recently have been proposed [1] [2] .
In this case, it is very important to authenticate the identity of the tag and/or the reader. In 2004, Juels [3] envisioned the concept of grouping proofs, which permits a lot of tags to be scanned simultaneously. In 2007, publications on EC-RAC (Elliptic Curve Based Randomized Access Control) protocol solve the scalability issues and can offer strong privacy protection [4] . However, Bringer [5] pointed out that the EC-RAC protocol vulnerable to various man-in-the-middle attacks. Thus, he proposes randomized Schnorr protocol to resist the known attacks. Later, Batina et al. [6] proposed a privacy-preserving multi-party grouping-proof protocol and demonstrate that their protocol can easily be extended to use cases with many tags, without any additional cost for protocol. However, Batina et al. [7] extend the concept to multiple levels of subgroups and demonstrate the feasibility of protocols for RFID tags, by using the hierarchical ECC-based RFID authentication protocol. Lin et al. [8] pointed out the weaknesses in the article of Batina [6] . They showed that the minimalist version of Batina is vulnerable to timeout problems and they proposed a new solution using ECC. They also introduced the corresponding grouping proofs and reduced the computation of tags. However, in [8] , it is shown that ECC-based grouping-proof RFID protocol is subject to unique man-in-the-middle attacks. As a result, the protocol has been gradually revised to tackle the known attacks and offer narrow-strong privacy.
Current various RFID authentication protocols have been proposed in the literature. Unlike these schemes, our protocol is based on ECC, grouping proof and RFID localization algorithms. This feature makes our proposed protocol lightweight enough to be proved suitable even for vast majority of the tags, as will be shown later in the paper.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic notation of proposed protocols, Extending ECC-based RFID authentication protocols, and security requirements, respectively. Assumptions and adversarial model is presented in section 3, while section 4 introduces a privacy-preserving RFID authenticate protocols against man-in-the-middle attacks, and section 5 discusses the privacy, cost and security analysis of the proposed scheme. The conclusion is given in section 6.
Preliminaries
This section first introduces the basic notation used in this work, extending ECC-based RFID authentication protocols, and security requirements, respectively. All the basic notations used in this work are depicted in Table 1 . 
Extending ECC-based RFID authentication protocols
Extending ECC-based RFID authentication protocols [6] works as follows. 
Security requirements
Secure communication schemes for constructing the grouping proof in an online setting should provide security requirements [11] [12], which are described as follows:
-Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks: The reader is compromised by the attackers, but both tags are assumed to be non-compromised. -Resistance to replay attacks: An eavesdropping outsider records previous messages and impersonate the two tags by non-compromised reader in later processes, with none of these tags being actually present. -Low computation and communication cost: Due to the power constraints and being incapable of autonomous activity, there should be low computation capability and high endurance demands. -Mutual authentication: Mutual authentication schemes support participants mutually to authenticate each other's identity and are designed to strike a balance between cost and functionality within the same protocol.
Assumptions and Adversarial Model

Assumptions and adversarial model
Tags and reader will construct the grouping proof in an online setting. Due to meet the need of simultaneously scanned, a timeout assumption is important. Accordingly, Yang et al. [13] have defined man-in-the-middle attackers by wide adversary in the privacy model. When an attacker verifies the verification of the grouping proof, he is a wide attacker.
This adversary may eavesdrop on and modify their contents. The adversary may also instantiate new communication channels and directly interacts with honest participants. In particular, the adversary can attempt to perform man-in-the-middle, impersonation, eavesdrop, and any other passive or active attacks that involve communication channels. To address adversarial model, we shall constrain the impact of adversarial model by assuming that: -The attacker is wide attacker.
-The attacker can eavesdrop on and modify the communication contents between reader and tag.
-The attacker can simply perform addition and subtraction elliptic curve operation.
-The adversary cannot localize a tag while it verifies a challenge from a reader and/or while it computes its response to the reader.
Unique man-in-the-middle attacks
In this section, we study unique man-in-the-middle attacks on RFID protocols. Unique man-in-themiddle attacks are a plausible and important class of attacks, relevant for wide adversaries. Unique man-in-the-middle attacks can be modeled by assuming a wide-strong adversary. One can think of various scenarios for man-in-the-middle Attacks.
A well-known example is the untraceable RFID authentication protocols, which was proven to be secure [14] , but later shown to be flawed in the presence of man-in-the-middle attacks [15] . The manin-the-middle attack is performed in the protocols [6] .
Step1: The attacker utilizes the first session to monitor messages transmitted between the reader and the target tag: r a , T a,1 , T a,2 and T b,2 . Step2: The attacker pretends to be the identity of the server and utilizes the second step to collect the response of the target tag:
T . The second phase of the attack is depicted in Figure 2 . 2) The attacker sends T b,2 to the tag A.
3) The tag A computes ,2
is the x-coordinate of the point T b,2 on the elliptic curve. 
4) The tag
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The attacker launches a man-in-the-middle attack to trace the target tag. The third phase of the attack is depicted in Figure 3 . T to the server.
3) The server sends " ,2 b T to the tag while attacker sends it to the tag A.
4)
The server and the tag computes T  , and then sends it to the server. 
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T  and computes the equation as follow:
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The tag is authenticated by the server, because s a is valid identification value. In order to break the intractability of the protocol, the wide attacker judges whether the two tags are same through detecting results of validation server. Thus, the protocol [6] is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. It is easy to see that the man-in-themiddle attack shown in the preceding proof can be performed to Lin's protocol.
The Proposed Protocols Against Man-in-the-middle Attacks
We have supported that claim by presenting man-in-the-middle attacks on a number of protocols. Firstly, we have shown a man-in-the-middle attack on the protocol proposed by Yang [13] . This attack is more widely applicable and can be performed on other protocols [6] [7] [8] as well. Secondly, we have shown that Extending ECC-based RFID authentication protocols are not sufficient to prevent man-inthe-middle Attacks. To this end, we used a protocol proposed by Burmester which is wide-strong private if RFID Protocols for Localization Privacy is used.
At present, there exists no RFID protocol based solely on ECC that withstands man-in-the-middle Attacks. Motivated by this fact, we then design a widely used ECC-based RFID protocol that resists man-in-the-middle attacks. As a basis, we use a protocol proposed by Lin and the RFID protocols for localization privacy scheme of Burmester [16] . The construction of such a protocol is useful for several reasons. Firstly, ECC-based protocols aim to maintain privacy against man-in-the-middle attackers. Secondly, in our proposed protocol the RFID reader shares with each tag a secret key. Thirdly, we have active RFID tags that contain a real-time clock and a higher forward link capability. RFID tags know the current time and their locations. Figure 4 shows our proposed privacy-preserving RFID authenticate protocols. Step4: The tag A will then compute the response t a,2 using its private key s a , the random number r a , and the x-coordinate of the challenge t b,2 . The tag A sends the message t a,2 to indicate the reader. To prevent a replay attack, the protocol first checks the grouping proof in step 6, if the grouping proof was not already sent before. Then, it performs the last computations. The multiple-parties grouping protocol works similarly to use the same principle as described in [8] [17] .
Protocol description
However, in our proposed protocol, each tag only computes one point multiplication. We have solved timeout problem of tag A, before the protocol has been accomplished if n is large.
Results and Discussion
As for the basic version of the protocol, privacy and cost analysis follow from Batina [6] , and is hence also narrow strong privacy-preserving. In Batina's protocol, each tag computes two point multiplications. However, in our proposed protocol, each tag only computes one point multiplication.
In addition, our proposed protocol have solved timeout problem of tag A, before the protocol has terminated. It is possible for a lot of tags to run the protocol "online" (i.e., instead of the reader generating the random challenge r s ). Security analysis performs the following theories.
Resistance to man-in-the-middle attack
A man-in-the-middle attacker can intercept and relay the challenge between an authorized reader and the tag by the compromised reader. A man-in-the-middle adversary can launch an online man-inthe-middle attack to relay the messages of the RFID reader to the tag, when the tag is not in time range of an authorized reader.
When tags are interrogated several times with a man-in-the-middle adversary by a noncompromised reader, the attacker cannot localize a tag. However, replaying the challenge of the tag will fail, because the challenge contains temporal information (|time t − time r | < δ time ).
Online man-in-the-middle attacks on proposed protocols are thwarted by the broadcast range of RFID readers, because many tags are able to determine their location in the range of the reader; when such attacks on location mechanisms are detected by tags and the reader, because tags and the reader have highly synchronized clocks.
So our proposed protocol can protect localization privacy against the man-in-the-middle attack.
Resistance to replay attack
The verifier first checks the tags' responses in correct order, before the grouping proof ( T a,1 , t a,2 , T b,1 , t b,2 ) was not already sent (this would indicate that Lee's protocol [14] suffer from a replay attack).The replay attacks is thwarted in our proposed protocol because the freshness of the messages transmitted is protected by the temporal information and the localization information. This assures localization privacy. The adversary cannot perform replay attacks beyond the range of the reader, because the challenge information included loc r ; then the adversary cannot perform replay attacks in the range of the reader at a later time, because the challenge information included time r . Subsequently, the adversary cannot replay the challenge of the reader in the identical place, because the challenge contains temporal information; then the adversary cannot replay the challenge to other places when the tag is challenged beyond the range of the reader, because the challenge contains loc t .
The reader authenticates the tag by using time r , i and loc r in Step 5, and the tag authenticates the reader by using j in Step 6, so the proposed protocol has mutual authentication. Then, the real location of the tag is identified in Step 6 by using a RFID localization algorithm [16] . Finally forging the MAC information is not possible.
The security analysis comparisons between our proposed protocol and other two protocols are summarized in Table 2 . 
